OPERATION AUSSIES HOME
RAAF INCIDENT: TECHNICAL ISSUES
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    1. YOUR DETAILS.

    First Name: Surname:

    Your E-mail Address:


    Your Background re Vietnam / Aviation / Radar / the Canberra Bomber (B-57) / USAF or RAAF Service / GDB in Vietnam 1970 Style / etc:


    2. TARGET AND SUPPORTED UNIT.

    Where was the target located?


    What unit was being supported by this mission on 3 Nov 70?



    Is there any record of this mission in the COMBAT AIR ACTIVITIES FILE (CACTA), Oct 1965 - Dec 1970?



    3. CRC.

    Of what type was the "large high-performance radar" used by 620 TCS at PANAMA CRC?


    What was the range of the "large high-performance radar" used by 620 TCS at PANAMA CRC?



    4. CRP.

    What were the locations of the outlying radars at the various CRP that were to augment the information of PANAMA CRC?


    Were these CRP provided by 620 TCS?


    What type of radar was used at these CRP?


    What was the range of the radar used by these CRP?



    5. PHU BAI MSQ-77 SITE.

    What was the name of parent unit of Phu Bai MSQ-77 site?


    6. DISTRESS CALL.

    Flying rules called for all airborne aircraft in Vietnam to monitor the "Guard Channel" on 243.0 MHz. Obvious reasons were to listen for a "recall", announcements about "heavy artillery" impact zones or emergency calls. It is assumed that no distress call was made because either the radio equipment was in operable or the crew had been in capacitated. Is this a reasonable assumption?


    Please explain you reasons for your "Yes" or "No" answer.



    7. REPORT OF THE LKP.

    At this stage the reporting of the LKP of the aircraft by a radar station at Udorn was not understood. If my arithmetic is correct, neither the MSQ-77 nor the TSQ-96 operating from Udon Thani had the range to see the aircraft at it's LKP.

    How was the radar station at Udorn involved in this incident?


    Perhaps a more powerful radar was used from Udorn to take the reading or perhaps the reading was taken by a station in Vietnam and fed back to Udorn. Do you think this was likely?


    Please explain you reasons for your answer.


    What was the location of the radar station that actually made the reported reading of 10740E and 1545N?


    What type of radar was used to make the reading of 10740E and 1545N?


    What was the degree of accuracy of the radar that made this reading? Please indicate in degrees, minutes, seconds or mils plus or minus.



    8. BEEPER SIGNAL IN VICINITY OF GR YC 880 490.

    What source actually reported the beeper signal from vicinity of GR YC 880 490?


    What type of beeper was being used by the RAAF in No. 2 Squadron in Nov 70? (Method of use and activation.)



    9. RECORDS.

    Where are the voice tapes of conversations of 3 Nov 70 between Captain Hanig and the crew of aircraft A84-231?


    Where is the paper copy of the radar track of the aircraft?




    This page was last updated on the 28 July 2002.