ADF
POLICY ON MIA - PRESUMED DEAD
(A copy of this document was requested under the FOI Act 1982 Section 15 but the copy published here was kindly provided by Defence staff in advance or in-lieu.)
OPERATION AUSSIES HOME needs to
understand the Defence policy associated with the recovery of remains of our
six men if we are going to be a constructive participant. The relevant
document, Defence Instruction (General) PERS 20-4 can be seen here.
DI(G) PERS 20-4
In summary, “The ADF retains responsibility for the recovery of
human remains of ADF members killed in conflict” [1]
with the proviso that “The ADF will
investigate the discovery of human remains alleged to be those of an ADF
member, or members, only where there is strong circumstantial or definite
evidence that such an allegation is justified.” para 6.
This proviso is clarified by the
following statement: “Allegations
that the remains of MIA members of the ADF have been located need to be
supported by strong circumstantial or definite evidence before public funds are
used to investigate the remains. Such evidence may include:
a.
items of ADF clothing or equipment found with, or near, the
remains;
b.
eyewitness accounts of the burial of remains; or
c. substantiated research from military records.
Unsubstantiated hearsay
evidence is insufficient grounds for the ADF to investigate human remains. When
hearsay evidence is provided to the ADF, in an endeavour to substantiate
information provided, the appropriate civilian authorities (foreign or
otherwise) should be requested to carry out initial inquiries.” [2]
ISSUES
The fundamental issue that inhibits
the recovery of our six men from Vietnam is that there is no Defence sponsored
policy for the research of the six cases. The ADF “retains responsibility for the recovery of human remains of
ADF members killed in conflict” but requires “strong circumstantial or definite evidence before
public funds are used to investigate the remains.” Being a taxpayer, I applaud
such an approach; however, we still need purposeful investigation of what has
happened to these six men, if we are interested in recovering their remains.
Of course
from time to time information is received from other sources, mainly the US
authorities, regarding our cases but there is no active collection plan, driven
by Australia or the US for the systematic collection of information related to
our men. The efforts as outlined in the policy are purely reactive.
To achieve a result we need:
q
Investigation of facts, recorded evidence and anecdotal evidence with
minimum hearsay; and
q
in-country intelligence gathering guided by a purposeful collection plan
THE
REALITY OF THE ADF POLICY
Defence
has numerous cases to manage from both World Wars and Korea. The resources that
would be required to actively investigate all of these would be quite
considerable and prohibitive, to put it mildly. To expect Defence to actively
investigate all MIA is not an option.
Perhaps there is a an argument to give priority to our six cases from Vietnam, considering the following:
A. Closeness in
Time. The Vietnam War is the most recent:
q
There are many close
family and friends of the missing men are still living and wondering.
q
In-country Sources
are getting old. If we act now then we can use the human in-country sources The
ones who knew what was going on in the late 60's and early 70’s are probably
approaching 70 YOA now, if still living.
B. Technology.
q
The use of more
sophisticated communications equipment allowed for the almost continuous exchange
of information.
q
The increasing use
of computers during the war and thereafter has facilitated the capturing,
storing and retrieving of information
q
Certain
technologies (e.g. GPS) facilitate
on-site investigations.
q
Techniques for ID
have been improved.
C. US infrastructure for in-country intelligence
gathering and investigation exists and could be more fully utilized by
Australia.
There are some “positives” in the
ADF policy in that:
q
“When Service authorities are satisfied that justification
exists for the commencement of an investigation into the recovery of some human
remains, the approving authorities for single Service investigations are the
Service Deputy Chiefs.” [3]So
the ADF does not need to make a federal case out of getting support if solid
evidence is presented.
q
“When hearsay evidence is
provided to the ADF, in an endeavour to substantiate information provided, the
appropriate civilian authorities (foreign or otherwise) should be requested to
carry out initial inquiries.” [4]
In the case of our six men, the US and Vietnamese authorities are in a position
to provide such assistance if asked.
As
mentioned above we must avoid making decisions on hearsay and search out FACTS
that can be substantiated.
CONCLUSION
ADF Policy
is seen as realistic and, as policy, it can be applied to the relevant
scenarios by those required to discharge it.
In the
case of our six cases from Vietnam we could do more but must “Do it now”
if we are going to fully capitalize on available opportunities.
Resources
are required now for comprehensive investigation of our six cases utilizing
whatever information is currently available in whatever repositories, followed
by in-country exploitation of human resources. How to do this within the scope
of DI(G) PERS 20-4 is the
challenge.