Most evidence points to the SAS patrol, of which FISHER was a member being in contact with the Ba Long Province Battalion just prior to the incident." "Australian Army records indicate the patrol to which FISHER belonged was at the time of the incident probably in contact with the security elements of these headquarters". This suggests that elements of the Ba Long Province Battalion were protecting the Baria Long Khanh Province Headquarters.

Tracks and Camps. There were numerous well-used tracks in the area. These are plotted on the map shown here.

Contacts. The details of contacts between the opposing forces are also shown on the map referred to above.

Anecdotal evidence indicates that "C Coy 9 RAR … were constantly finding fresh enemy sign including very well used tracks and camps … The enemy sign … was so fresh that I have no doubt that enemy activity was continuing during our occupation."

Assessment of the Level of enemy Activity. Considering the tracks and camps found in the area between 27 September 1969 and 4 October 1969, it is apparent that there was significant enemy activity in the incident area. More specifically, in an area of just over one square kilometre during the period from the 27 September 1969 to the 4 October 1969, 37 to 47 enemy were encountered. In addition, a camp with an unspecified capacity was located.

Enemy Behaviour. The enemy were not suicidal. When in small numbers, the withdrew when contacted. It is noted that the 20 - 30 enemy who engaged Patrol 11 at about 0900 hrs on 27 September 1969 were aggressive in the first instance but broke contact and withdrew south after approximately 45 minutes. This withdrawal would have lessened the possibility of this group being engaged by offensive air power and would indicate that he had a healthy respect for such weaponry.

ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT

Report by a Member of the Baria Long Khanh Province Headquarters. Regarding a visit to the site on 15 May 1984, the mission reported as follows: "Visit to the Site in Dong Nai Province involving Lance Corporal D.J.E. FISHER. The Mission was guided to the vicinity of the incident by Captain Truong Cong Thanh, a member of the Dong Nai Province Military Headquarters. At the time of the incident (September 1969) he claimed to have been a member of the Baria Long Khanh Province Headquarters. He did not recall such an incident as that involving Lance Corporal FISHER having occurred. Australian Army records indicate the patrol to which Lance Corporal FISHER belonged was at the time of the incident probably in contact with the security elements of these headquarters."

Possibility of enemy Observing the Fall of FISHER. The terrain was relatively flat, with a maximum elevation of 145 meters (476 feet) southeast of the general incident area at GR YS 640 949, over one kilometre from the likely impact site. At about 700 metres north of the incident area there was a band of high ground of 100 metres and rising to the north. The valley of the SUOI SAP was quite flat at an elevation of about 90 metres (295 feet). This afforded a maximum variation in height of 65 metres (213 feet). The height from which FISHER fell was 210 feet. As reported, there were stands of jungle to a height of 70 feet in the area.

Considering these three facts, it would have been difficult for any enemy in the area to have a line of sight on FISHER as he fell unless:

• The enemy was manning an elevated OP, perhaps in a tree, in which case it would have been quite difficult at a range of 700 meters or more to observe a falling soldier dressed in a camouflage suit against a background of vegetation on the high ground opposite, or
• The enemy were in a relatively open area with an unobstructed view of FISHER as he fell. Considering the air activity in the area at the time of FISHER'S fall, the probability of the enemy being in a position to observe his fall is assessed as low.

Sound of FISHER Falling. It is possible that FISHER could have fallen close by any enemy who were in the area of FISHER'S fall and that they could have heard him crashing through the timber, if any were encountered, and the sound of his impact. However, it should be remembered that there were six helicopters in the general area at the time of FISHER'S falling.

Recovery of FISHER by the Enemy. In the event of the enemy either seeing or hearing FISHER fall, they would have had to travel to the suspected location of the impact and actually locate the body. Exposing his troops to recover a dead or dying soldier would probably not have been seen as an attractive proposition to the enemy commander. If FISHER fell in the FRIST AREA, the enemy would have had less opportunity to locate him. Considering the air activity in the area after FISHER'S fall, the insertion of Patrol 16 and the potential cost - benefit to the enemy, the probability of them having located FISHER, dead or alive, in the FIRST AREA on 27 September 1969, is assessed as very low. The probability of them finding his body is considered to be greater should he have fallen in the vicinity of GR YS 627 957; however, the probability of this outcome is still assessed as being low.

OTHER SOURCES REGARDING INTERACTION WITH THE ENEMY

No Report to Locals for Propaganda. If the enemy had captured FISHER or recovered his body during the period when it would have been recognisable as a Caucasian soldier, particularly an Australian, the enemy could have used such an event for propaganda purposes. There is no evidence of any such report.

Red Cross. OIC CARO requested advice from the Red Cross regarding any news of FISHER, whether he was POW or whether his death had been confirmed. In November 1969 advice was received from the International Committee of the Red Cross Geneva that they had no means of questioning the National Liberation Front authorities but would keep FISHER'S details on file.

Four Party Joint Military Team. In mid May 1973 it was established that the names of FISHER and Parker had not been tabled during the discussions of the Four-Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) as a result of an enquiry by the Australian Embassy in Saigon to the US Delegation. On behalf of the Australian government, the US Delegation to the FPJMT asked the Chiefs of the other delegations to provide information on the eight Australians.

Discussions with Province Chief. On 29 September 1975, the case was discussed with the Province Chief by JCRC staff. Hostile threat precluded a visit to the site at that time. Also in September 1975 FISHER'S identification details were passed to the FPJMT with a request for information. No information was forthcoming.

FISHER was wearing his dog tags at the time of the fall and, provided they remained with his body on impact (which is assessed as highly probable), his remains would have been identifiable if located by the enemy or by Vietnamese civilians.

Medical and dental records for our six MIA were requested in 1982 by the US Department of the Army and the Australian Embassy in Washington forwarded these records to the US Department of State on the 9 November 1982. In 1995 the provision of dental records was discussed between CILHI. Hence records have been widely available to assist in identifying remains that may have become available.

SUMMARY REGARDING THE POW SCENARIO

If FISHER did not die on impact he would have died shortly thereafter and it is assessed as highly improbable that he was taken POW in that time. This possibility is not considered further. The probability that the enemy recovered FISHER'S body during the period when it would have been recognisable as a Caucasian soldier is assessed as low.

Since FISHER was not taken prisoner and no signs of his body or any of his equipment was found, the probability of his body being concealed or submerged is increased. Location of FISHER. Considering the discussion above, possible locations include:

• That he was submerged in water or mud - probable or more than probable.
• That he was somehow concealed by vegetation - probable.
• That his body was located and had been moved or buried by the enemy at some stage, prior to the arrival of the various search elements is considered to be of low to very low probability.